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Abstract-This paper reexamines a much-studied topic, the 
effects of surface freight regulation. It demonstrates that several 
studies use invalid methods to estimate the welfare costs of rate 
regulation, develops a correct procedure, and provides esti­
mates of the welfare effects using data and modal market share 
relationships estimated by Boyer. The paper also analyzes some 
implications of the common assumption that the demand for 
total freight shipments by all modes is perfectly inelastic. 
NUMEROUS studies have addressed the prob­lem of estimating the costs of resource misal­
location due to the regulation of surface freight 
transportation. Regulation creates inefficiency to 
the extent that it does not systematically relate 
prices to marginal costs. The theoretically correct 
method for estimating this inefficiency is to mea­
sure the loss in total surplus arising from the 
regulator's pricing policy. 
Most of the early studies of the effects of regula­
tion in this industry did not use this method, 
instead using the "comparative cost" approach.1 
The latter assumes that modes are perfect sub­
stitutes. The cost of regulation is then estimated as 
the difference in shipping costs between the mode 
by which shipments are transported and the lowest 
cost mode. 
More recent studies have used estimates of cross 
elasticities of demand to take account of the fact 
that most shippers do not regard transportation 
modes as perfect substitutes.2 Unfortunately, each 
of these studies adopts an approach that is not in 
general theoretically correct and that is likely to 
produce a biased estimate. Section I of this paper 
examines the methods for estimating welfare losses, 
and sections II and III use the data and economet­
ric results in one paper, Boyer (1977), to calculate 
the magnitude of the bias from using incorrect 
methods. As is customary in these studies, we are 
ignoring other costs of regulation. 
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I. Welfare Measurement in Interrelated 
Markets 
Let the tariffs for transporting a commodity be 
P; for mode i, i = 1, 2. The demand schedules for 
the two modes are assumed to be interdependent, 
and are written as X;(p1, p2). Let the marginal 
cost of transport service by mode i be a constant 
c;. Assuming that deregulation will lead to prices 
equal to marginal costs, the problem is to estimate 
the welfare effects of moving prices from (p1, p2) 
to (c1,c2). 
If income effects are zero, a measure of the sum 
of consumer and producer surplus (e.g., total 
surplus) associated with the set of tariffs (pi, p].) 
can be written (suppressing the argument of the 
demand schedules in the integral) as 
T(pi, Pz· p'{, P7:) = j(x1dP1 + X2dP2) 
r 
2 
+ L (p; - c;)x;(Pi. p2) 
i=l 
(1) 
over any path r that connects (pi, pz) with 
(p'{, p2), where x1(p'{, pl)= xi(p'{, pl)= 0. In 
other words, the demands are zero at the tariffs 
(p'{, p2). The independence of T(pi, P2) on the 
path of integration follows from the assumption of 
zero income effects. 
The change in total surplus that would result 
from a movement of tariffs from (pi, p2) to 
marginal costs ( c1, c2) can be written as 
AT= j(x1dp1 + x2dp2) 
r 
2 
- L (p; - c;)x;(Pi. Pz) , (2) 
i=l 
where r is any path from ( c1, c2) to (pi, p2). Some 
possible paths of integration are shown in figure 1. 
The AT obtained in this process is the gain in total 
surplus that would result if marginal cost pricing 
were used instead of the tariffs {pi, p2). 
Suppose we want to estimate the welfare effects 
associated with moving one of these tariffs (say, 
p1) from its regulated level (pi) to marginal cost 
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FIGURE 1.-PATHS OF INTEGRATION 
I 
P1 
p* ------
Notation: 
P; = tariff on mode i _ 
pj = regulated tariff on mode i 
c; = marginal cost on mode i. 
( c1). Assume that under regulation in neither mode
does price equal marginal cost (i.e., p; =F c;, for
i = 1, 2). One way to estimate these welfare effects
is to evaluate the expression T( c1, p2, p?, pl) -
T(pi, p2, p?, pl), in which the first tariff is moved
from Pi to c1 and the second tariff remains at
P2 =F c2• In this case the welfare effects of mode 1
regulation cannot be evaluated without informa­
tion about the change in the demand for mode 2 
service that would occur as a result of the change 
in the first tariff. The effect of a dif­
ferential change in p1 on T is estimated by
ar = ( ' - c)ax1(Pi.P2)ap1 P1 i ap1 
+ ( I - ) 
ax2(Pi, P2)P2 c2 ap1 
(3) 
The standard approximation of (3) for a change 
from Pi to c1 is
6.T1 ""' �(Pi - c1)[ x1( C1, P2) - X1(Pi, P2)]
-( P2 - C2 )[ X2 (Pi, P2) - X2 ( C1, P2)] · 
(4) 
The first term on the right hand side of (4) is the 
dead weight loss triangle, computed using the 
Marshallian demand for xv evaluated at P2. With
FIGURE 2.-CHANGE IN TOTAL SURPLUS IF MARGINAL 
COST PRICING Is ADOPTED IN MARKET 1 
p� 
'--------·· '---------x, 
Notation: 
x; = quantity shipped by mode i 
P; = tariff on mode i 
X;(Pt> p2) = demand curve for mode i 
pj = regulated tariff on mode i 
c; = marginal cost on mode i. 
constant marginal costs, the second term corre­
sponds to the change in profits for mode 2 result­
ing from the change in that mode's traffic when 
the tariff in mode 1 is moved from p]_ to c1. The
total surplus change is thus depicted in figure 2. 
The change in total surplus is the shaded area 
ABD minus the shaded area EFGH, approximated 
by (4). This corresponds to the vertical part of 
path 2 in figure 1. 
To estimate the change in total surplus associ­
ated with moving both tariffs to marginal cost, 
path 2 (figure 1) must be completed by integrating
its horizontal portion. The welfare effect of a dif­
ferential change in p2, holding p1 constant, is
aT = ( _ c ) 
ax1(P1• P2)
ap2 Pi i ap2 
+ ( _ ) ax2(P1• P2) P2 c2 a .P2 (5) 
On the horizontal segment of path 2, p1 = c1, so
that the first term of (5) is zero. Hence (5) is 
estimated as 
6.T2 ""' �(P2 - c2)[ x2(c1, c2) - X2( C1, P2)] · 
(6) 
Equation (6) is the usual dead weight loss triangle, 
computed using the Marshallian demand schedule 
x2, evaluated at p1 = c1. This is depicted in figure
3 as the shaded area IJK, which, when added to 
area ABD minus EFGH in figure 2, approximates 
the total surplus gain that could be realized if 
marginal cost pricing were used instead of the 
- --------------------
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FIGURE 3.-CHANGE IN TOTAL SURPLUS IF MARGINAL 
COST PRICING ls ADOPTED IN MARKET 2 
L---------------� x2 
Notation: 
x; = quantity shipped by mode i 
P; = tariff on mode i 
X;(p1, p2) = demand curve for mode i 
p; = regulated tariff on mode i 
c; = marginal cost on mode i. 
regulated tariffs. Total surplus is maximized with 
marginal cost pricing, so that area ABD plus area 
IJK minus area EFGH must be nonnegative (area 
ABD minus area EFGH may be negative). 
As an alternative to the use of Marshallian 
demand schedules, it is also possible to employ 
mutatis mutandis demand schedules (in which both 
prices vary simultaneously), shown by path 1 in 
figure 1. By integrating along path 1, the welfare 
loss from regulation can be estimated as 
aT = � [ X1(c1, c2) - X1(Pi, P:i)][ pi - c1] 
+ � [ X2 (c1, cz) - Xz(pi, P2)](p2 - cz)· 
(7) 
The method of (7) is an alternative to summing the 
estimates from (4) and (6). If the approximations 
used to write (4), (6) and (7) are correct, both 
methods will produce the same estimate of the 
change in surplus. In practice, if the demand rela­
tionships are not exactly consistent with the ap­
proximated surplus equations, the methods will 
produce different estimates. In section II these 
methods are compared using Boyer's data. 
A surprisingly common practice in transporta­
tion studies is to overlook some of the components 
of total surplus. Indeed, among studies using 
surplus analysis only Levin (1978) uses a theoreti­
cally correct path of integration. Boyer (1977), 
Friedlaender (1969) and Keeler (1976) ignore in­
termodal effects. Friedlaender and Spady (1980) 
and Moore (1975) attempt to account for inter­
modal cross-elasticities of demand, but use an 
incorrect procedure. Spann and Erickson (1970) 
and Zerbe (1980), in estimating the welfare effects 
of early railroad regulation, implicitly assume zero 
cross-elasticity between long-haul and short-haul 
shipments. 
In addition, some studies also incorrectly try to 
determine how much of the total surplus change 
should be attributed to each mode if both tariffs 
are changed to marginal costs. The method adopted 
is to calculate the welfare gain from deregulation 
in one mode by holding the other price fixed, and 
then to calculate the gains from deregulation in 
the second mode, given the new price in the first. 
This procedure is faulty because no such unique 
measure exists. For example, in figure 1, a path of 
integration that changed p2 first, moving from 
(pi, p2) to (pi, c2) to ( c1, c2), would normally 
produce a different "allocation" of the welfare 
gains between modes than an integration along 
path 2 would yield, even though the totals would 
be the same in the absence of errors of approxima­
tion. In general, the line integral is a function of 
rate changes in both modes, and cannot be written 
separably to ascribe a unique and meaningful 
change in surplus to either mode individually. 
A final source of error in other studies is the 
common assumption that total freight shipments 
are unaffected by tariffs. The comparative cost 
studies estimate the costs of regulation by reallo­
cating actual shipments in a given year according 
to marginal costs and multiplying the amounts of 
shipments reallocated by the differences in costs 
between the modes. Boyer and Levin employ a 
logit model to estimate the market share of each 
mode, given tariffs in all modes. The quantity of 
shipments by mode is then calculated by multiply­
ing these shares by the actual quantity of ship­
ments in a given year. This ignores any business 
gained or lost by the transportation sector as a 
result of changed prices; in (7), ax1 must be equal 
in magnitude and opposite in sign to ax2• 
The assumption of perfectly inelastic total de­
mand affects the estimated welfare effects of price 
changes. The quantity to be shipped by mode i, x;, 
is defined to be the share, S;. of the market shipped 
by that mode times the total quantity shipped by 
both modes. Thus, a change in p1 can be expected 
REGULATION OF SURFACE FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION 83 
to affect X; as follows: 
ax; as; ( ) 
( axi ax2 ) 
api = api xi+ x2 + s; api + api . {8) 
If the total ton miles of freight shipped by both 
modes is assumed to be constant, the second term 
of (8) will be zero by assumption 
( axi 
+ 
ax2 = o). api api 
In reality, if Pi drops while p2 is unchanged, one 
would expect the sign of the second term to be 
negative, since shippers might demand more trans­
portation when one tariff is lowered. The data 
used to estimate the modal split equation will be 
from various markets with different tariffs. Hence 
the parameters estimated in the modal split equa­
tion will incorporate both market-elasticity and 
cross-elasticity effects into a model that explicitly 
accounts for only the latter. The predicted share of 
a mode after a price decrease will be a share of a 
quantity that reflects both elasticity effects; how­
ever, the (smaller) initial quantity will be multi­
plied by this new estimated share to determine the 
new quantity shipped by the same mode. 
Thus, the inelasticity assumption will lead to an 
understatement of the effects of a change in Pi on 
Xi and to an overestimate of the extent to which 
mode 2 will be affected by a change in Pi· Further, 
in each case the magnitude of the effect will be 
most significant when the market share of the 
corresponding mode is large. This is apparent from 
(8), in which S; is the coefficient on the quantity 
effect that is assumed to be zero. 
How does the inelasticity assumption affect the 
estimates of the change in welfare resulting from 
movements of tariffs in both markets to marginal 
costs? To answer this question, we analyze the 
effects of the inelasticity assumption using the 
method of calculation of (7). Consider an estima­
tion of the change in X; that would result from a 
movement of both tariffs from their regulated levels 
to marginal cost. An approximation of this change, 
(lix;)*, without the inelasticity assumption can be 
written as 
i = 1,2. (9) 
For notational convenience, let Xi + x2 = Q at 
(pi, p2), and rewrite (9) as 
( A )* � [ as; aQ ( ')] U.X; = £.._, a. Q + S;a. CJ - P1 ; J=i p, P, 
i = 1, 2. (10) 
From (7), the change in total surplus, AT*, 
without the inelasticity assumption, from moving 
both tariffs to marginal costs is approximately 
2 
AT*= L (p; - c;){Ax;)*. (11) 
i=i 
Finally, after some algebra, AT* can be ap­
proximated as 
AT*=! t [(p;- c;) t as; Q(c1 - PJ)l 2 i= i J=i ap1 
1 [ 2 aQ I 
l 
[ 2 I 
l + 2 _L a.(c; - P;) _L (P; - c;)S; . 1=i p, 1=i 
(12) 
The first term on the right hand side of (12) 
would be the welfare change estimated if the in­
elasticity assumption were vali�. Denote this term 
by ATe. The bias introduced if the inelasticity 
assumption is invalid is captured by the second 
term on the right hand side of (12), which is 
denoted by 6. Note that if the inelasticity assump­
tion is valid, 6 = 0 because aQ/ a pi is zero. 
The sign of 6 must be positive whenever both 
regulated tariffs depart from marginal costs in the 
same direction, because in either case both of the 
bracketed components of 6 are of the same sign. 
Thus, a larger estimate of. the welfare effects of 
regulation would be expected if the inelasticity 
assumption were not imposed. The sign of 6 can­
not be determined purely theoretically if the regu­
lated tariff exceeds marginal cost in one market, 
but is less than marginal cost in the other, for then 
the two bracketed components of 6 may or may 
not have the same sign. 
II. The Effects of Invalid Paths of Integration 
In this section, the data and demand equations 
presented by Boyer are used to recalculate the 
welfare effects of regulation in 1963 along a valid 
path of integration. The approximations in both 
equation (7) and equations (4) and (6) are used. 
The results of these calculations are shown in 
table 1. 
00 
""' 
1963 
¢/Ton· Mile Ton· Miles 
Mileage S1 at of Traffic S1 at 
Block (pJ., Pz) pJ. Pz C1 Cz (billions) ( c1, pz) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
25 0.35 6.14 19.84 6.64 18.56 2.63 0.33 
75 0.36 3.21 10.41 2.97 8.45 7.51 0.38 
150 0.50 2.69 6.88 2.00 5.94 21.09 0.60 
250 0.55 2.23 4.97 1.61 5.17 26.92 0.68 
350 0.60 2.11 4.00 1.44 4.96 17.62 0.75 
450 0.66 2.05 3.98 1.37 4.86 22.32 0.80 
550 0.68 2.11 3.99 1.29 4.81 22.05 0.83 
700 0.71 1.87 3.45 1.24 4.73 40.01 0.84 
900 0.76 1.71 3.24 1.18 4.68 33.15 0.86 
1100 0.79 1.74 3.23 1.16 4.65 18.93 0.89 
1350 0.83 1.75 2.59 1.13 4.62 21.03 0.93 
1750 0.86 1.68 2.47 1.11 4.59 39.30 0.94 
Total 
Sources:Col. 2 from Boyer (table 4. column 9) 
Col. 3 from Boyer (table 4. column 5) 
Col. 4 from Boyer (table 4. column 6) 
Col. 5 from Boyer (table 4, column 2) 
Col. 6 from Boyer (table 4, column 3) 
Col. 7 from Boyer (table 4, column 8) 
Cols. 8-13. calculated as described in text 
Col. 14 from Boyer (table 4, column 11), where n.c. means not calculated. 
•Correction of Boyer's reponed numbers using his methodology and data 
µ�·· 
-� 
TABLE !.-WELFARE CALCULATIONS 
�W4from S1 at �J.'f6 from �W4 + �J.t6 �W7from Boyer's W rail 
Eq. ( 4), $ mil. (c1,c2) Eq. (6), $mil. $mil. Eq. (7), $mil. $mil. 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1.0 0.31 0.3 1.3 0.9 n.c. 
-3.0 0.32 4.6 1.6 2.6 n.c. 
-12.9 0.56 4.3 -8.6 -1.6 4.4 
17.8 0.69 0.3 18.1 14.3 10.8a 
34.7 0.80 4.1 38.8 28.7 11.8 
37.5 0.81 0.7 38.2 31.3 13.7 
41.5 0.86 2.4 43.9 32.5 16.3 
82.8 0.89 12.8 95.6 68.8 22.7 
57.0 0.91 11.7 68.7 49.0 13.2 
31.6 0.93 5.6 37.2 34.2 7.7 
49.2 0.96 6.4 55.6 36.2 8.5 
76.2 0.97 12.1 88.3 58.1 12.3a 
413.4 65.3 478.7 355.0 121.4a 
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The demand equation that Boyer used to calcu­
late welfare effects was as follows: 
Llln
81 = -4.15[( P1 ) - ( P1 ) ] (13) S2 P2 a P2 b 
where 
a modal index, 1 for rail, 2 for motor 
carriers 
S; = the share of traffic for mode i, where 
S1 + S2 = 1 
p; = the tariff for mode i 
b = the state before tariffs are changed 
a = the state after tariffs are changed. 
In table 1, the welfare change associated with 
the rail rate change (with no change in the motor 
carrier rate) is calculated from (4) and reported as 
�»'4 in column 9. The estimated welfare effect of 
railroad regulation is $413.4 million, which is much 
larger than Boyer's estimate (column 14). 
To complete the estimate of the welfare effects 
of regulation for both modes, we carry out the 
calculation of equation (6), reported as �»(, in 
column 11. 3 Column 11 is the incremental gain 
from deregulating trucks, given that railroads have 
been deregulated. The total welfare effect of regu­
lation, the sum of columns 9 and 11 (shown in 
column 12), is $478.7 million.4 
In column 13 we use the mutatis mutandis de­
mand schedules of equation (7) to calculate an 
alternative estimate of the welfare loss from regu­
lation. This estimate is $355 million. 
Boyer's estimate of the total cost of regulation is 
much less than either of ours. The source of the 
difference is that he overlooks the effect of railroad 
deregulation on truck profits. This biases his result 
downward because, according to his data, truck 
prices are below marginal cost for long-distance 
shipping, so that truck profits increase if they lose 
market share in these mileage blocks. This we view 
as highly implausible, although we use his data in 
our calculations to compare our welfare estimates 
with his. 
3 Column 10 differs from Boyer's predicted market shares in 
column 10 of table 4 of his paper. Our calculations avoid the 
error made by Boyer that is discussed in footnote 10 of Levin's 
p�er. . Each entry m column 12 should be positive. An anomalous 
result that cannot be correct appears in the 150 mileage block. 
This could occur because of approximation error or because 
there are errors in the estimates of the demand structure not 
explored in this paper. 
The difference in our two estimates arises from 
the error introduced by using the standard ap­
proximations of the surplus equations. The term 
(p; - c;) is as much as 35% ofp; for rails and 80% 
for trucks in some mileage blocks. Thus, it is 
stretching matters to regard the change in tariffs as 
"small" for purposes of approximation. 
III. The Effects of the Inelastic Demand 
Assumption 
This section explores the empirical significance 
of the assumption that the total market demand 
for surface freight transportation is perfectly in­
elastic with respect to all tariffs. Direct estimation 
of the effects of this assumption would require 
econometric estimates of properly specified modal 
demand equations that, among other things, in­
cluded the tariffs for all modes in the demand 
equation of each. We have not attempted this. 
Instead, we have used Boyer's data to estimate the 
sensitivity of his estimates of welfare loss to alter­
native assumptions about the price elasticity of 
market demand. Consider two effects on ship­
ments in mode i due to a change in its price, P;: 
the change in mode i's share of total shipping, and 
the change in mode i's shipments owing to a 
change in total shipping. Let s be the proportional­
ity factor between these quantities: 
aQ 
= s as; Q (14) ap; ap; · 
The right-hand side of (14) can be substituted for 
the term aQ/ a P; in (12), and the data in table 1 
can then be used to estimate the change in surplus 
as a function of s. 
Of course, s is closely related to the elasticity of 
total shipments with respect to a change in modal 
prices. If both sides ·of (14) are divided by the ratio 
of Q to P;. the result is 
(15) 
where e is is the elasticity of mode i's share with 
respect to P; and e; is the elasticity of total demand 
with respect to P;· 
Values of S;e;, can be calculated from table 1, 
and tend to lie in the range -0.2 to -0.5 for rails, 
and between - 0.05 and -0.3 for trucks. Thus, if 
e; were -0.1 (e.g., a 10% change inp; causes a 1% 
net change in total shipments), s would fall in the 
range of 0.2 to 0.4 for rails and between 0.3 and 
2.5 for trucks. Alternatively, a value of s of unity 
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TABLE 2.-ADDITIONAL WELFARE EFFECTS IF DEMAND ELASTICITY NONZERO 
(FIGURE IN $ MILLIONS) 
Mileage Assumption Assumption Assumption Assumption Welfare Estimates at Zero Elasticity 
Block A B c D Path 1 (AW7) Boyer Rail Only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
25 0 0 0 0.9 n.c. 
75 8.2 2.9 1.3 0.5 2.6 n.c. 
150 24.3 6.7 7.3 2.0 -1.6 4.4 
250 8.1 1.2 11.8 2.5 14.3 10.8" 
350 0.4 0 10.6 2.2 28.7 11.8 
450 4.7 0.4 14.3 3.3 31.3 13.7 
550 7.9 1.3 18.5 4.8 32.5 16.3 
700 -8.0 -0.9 24.0 3.6 68.8 22.7 
900 1.0 0.2 13.3 3.7 49.0 13.2 
1100 1.7 0.6 8.7 2.9 34.2 7.7 
1350 2.3 0.7 10.7 3.9 36.2 8.5 
1750 3.9 1.7 15.7 7.1 58.1 12.3" 
TOTAL 54.5 14.8 136.2 36.5 355.0 121.4" 
Noles: 
Assumption A: if mode i changes ils price, the resulting change in shipments is equally divided into substitution from mode} and a nel increment to total 
traffic (s - 1). 
Assumption B: the elastici1y of total lraffic by all modes with respecl lo change in price in any one mode (e;) is -0.1. 
Assumption C: only rail rates change (lrucks now priced al marginal cosl) ands - 1. 
Assumption D: same as Assumption C, except er= 0.1. 
Columns (6) and (7) repealed from lable 1 for convenience. 
implies a value of e; of about - 0.35. These values 
are roughly consistent with the elasticities reported 
by Moore.5 
We have calculated the value of the last term in 
(12)-the magnitude of the bias from overlooking 
the net increments to shipping from a change in 
modal prices-using Boyer's data. The results are 
shown in table 2. If for each mileage block one 
selects a value of s that makes e; equal to - 0.1, 
the estimated welfare gain from marginal cost 
pricing increases by approximately $15 million 
(column (3)). If instead a value of s equal to unity 
is applied for all calculations, the estimated welfare 
gain from marginal cost pricing is increased by 
$55 million (column (4)). These calculations are 
substantially affected by the peculiar feature of 
Boyer's data that truck prices are below marginal 
costs for most blocks. If regulated truck prices are 
assumed to be equal to marginal cost, and if e; is 
assumed to be - 0.1, then the additional welfare 
5 Moore reports estimates of demand functions for trucks and 
rails that have cross-elasticities of demand of about 0.9 for both 
modes, and own-price elasticities of -1.8 for trucks and -0.9 
for rails. With about 60% of shipments in ton-miles moving by 
rail, this suggests that one-third of the new business generated 
by a reduction in rail tariffs is a net increase in total shipment 
(e.g., s = 0.5), whereas about one-fourth of trucking gains from 
a price reduction would be net new shipments (e.g., s = 0.33). 
These estimates are, of course, extremely crude, being based on 
single-equation demand models that aggregate over all types of 
commodities and shipping distances. 
gain from prices equal to marginal costs in rails is 
$36 million (column (5)). If s is assumed to be 
unity in all blocks, the additional gain is $136 
million (column (4)). As is apparent from table 2, 
these magnitudes are nontrivial fractions of Boyer's 
estimates of the welfare effects of regulation. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated methods for estimat­
ing the total welfare loss from the regulation of 
surface freight transportation. Numerous previous 
studies have been found to use invalid methods for 
calculating this loss. We have used methodologi­
cally correct procedures to estimate the welfare 
loss from regulation, using Boyer's data and market 
share estimation technique. Three principal find­
ings emerge. First, the choice of a correct path of 
integration increased the estimated welfare loss by 
a factor of three or four. Second, the choice of a 
path of integration substantially affects the esti­
mated welfare loss because of the errors intro­
duced by using the standard formulas to ap­
proximate surplus equations over relatively large 
changes in prices and quantities. Third, the as­
sumption that the total quantity of freight shipped 
by all modes is perfectly inelastic caused an under­
estimate of the welfare costs of regulation that is 
substantial. When the first and last effects are 
l' 
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accounted for, the estimate of the annual welfare 
loss of surface freight transportation is increased 
from $121 million to upwards of $500 million. 
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